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ARTISANS VS. FABRICANTS: URBAN PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF WORK CULTURE IN LODEVE AND BEDARIEUX, 1740-1830

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Artisans vs. Fabricants: Urban Protoindustrialization and the Evolution of Work Culture in Lodève and Bédarieux, 1740-1830*

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A good deal of our work as historians of the industrial transition has been concerned with the ways in which that vast, amorphous, and ill-defined category of handworkers called "artisans" experienced the profound economic and legal changes of the age. Our image of their "traditional" status tends to situate them in guilds or, if journeymen, as aspirants to guild status, and ascribe to them values inimical to capitalism. This value system, often identified as the "corporate mentality" is then supposedly carried into the "industrial" era and provides an essential element in the artisans' ideology that legitimated their protest against emergent industrial capitalism. Artisans are thus portrayed as victims of the new order. An older view saw their action as a response to technological change and manifested especially in the "hopeless" struggle against the machine. More recently, structural change and proletarianization (which includes de-skilling, growing competition with unapprenticed "outsiders," and loss of income) without mechanization necessarily playing a role have received more emphasis in explaining artisan protest. The general assumption is that these casualties of the industrial revolution experienced a "downhill slide" that heightened their will to protest and that the inherently anti-capitalist humor bequeathed by the corporate tradition provided the ideological ballast keeping the struggle afloat. This struggle set the tone for the working-class movement, both in terms of strike activity and socialist beliefs, creating what Bernard Moss labelled "trade-socialism," and had an on-going manifestation in the syndicalism of the early twentieth century. Skilled workers and craft chauvinism continued to dominate the movement even though, as Hanagan and Hinton have argued, this skilled-worker militancy could be critical in sparking production workers' consciousness and could indeed create a revolu-

tionary potential.

Two basic points are central to this thesis: that the corporate, "artisanal" tradition provided the underpinning for the anti-capitalism of the early worker movement and that this continuity of the artisanal value system rested on the maintenance of craft practices, especially inter-craft distance, if not outright antagonism, a phenomenon caused by the fact that crafts largely experienced proletarianization separately. Beneath these perspectives is a rather "economistic" view of history that stresses the impact of the "industrial revolution" at the expense of the massive changes in political power relationships that culminated in the French Revolution.[1]

In recent essays and scholarly exchanges, philosopher-historian Jacques Rancière has questioned the significance of workplace changes, skill loss, trade socialism as response, and, more deeply, of the corporate tradition altogether, thus casting doubt upon the conceptual verities that have been associated with the word "artisan." Instead, in discussing the oft-noted militance of tailors and shoemakers during the July Monarchy, he stresses the importance of long-standing scorn, poverty, overcrowding of the trades, internal corporate conflict, and the Revolutionary ideology of social equality. Interestingly, he de-emphasizes the dynamic impact of capitalism, particularly--in the case of the clothing industries--the rise of ready-made goods. As he puts it: "In my view this militancy is less a response to capitalist assault, rooted in workshop problems and values, than a demand for a widening of social life and the public sphere, as they were shaped by the 'bourgeois' revolution."[2] While we shall have to wait for a full explication of his position--and he, like the rest of us, readily admits that he is still groping toward a general explanation of this critical problem--Rancière rightly castigates social and labor historians for ignoring the profound influence of the great political transformation occasioned by the French Revolution. On the other hand, he runs the risk, I believe, of relegating the massive economic changes associated with the rise of

industrial capitalism (understood as both a structural and technological transformation) to a secondary position, thus ignoring the fundamental reality of the age: the dynamic interaction of economic and political upheaval during the century spanning the French Revolution. How this "dual revolution," as Hobsbawm called it, actually worked, how alterations in the economy and alterations in the structure of the state interrelated still remains one of the most important unanswered questions in modern historiography. It is not the predominance of one or the other that is at issue, but the concrete analysis of process. Rancière's work, fascinating as it is, lacks this dynamic aspect and simply does not stretch far enough into the past, above all, to the fundamental changes in corporate structures that preceded and were then accentuated by the French Revolution.

Indeed, perhaps it was the experience with capitalism before and during the French Revolution that gave such compelling meaning to the egalitarian visions of Revolutionary ideology. For many artisans, master and journeymen alike, this experience was exhilarating as well as traumatic. The liberation dreaded by so many (and logically opposed as destructive of the entire hierarchical system of the Old Regime),[3] but promoted by an entrepreneurial minority in the days of Turgot, became a fact in 1791. Some members of the artisanat made a killing while many others were killed in the new competitive struggle. It would appear, however, that the nature of the state power and political influences were not foreign to success or failure. As R.M. Andrews has demonstrated, well-to-do entrepreneurs whose occupations we label "artisan" were prominent as political leaders in Paris during the Year II. Did such nouveaux-arrivés achieve power because they were economically influential or did their politics have something to do with their success? The answer is no doubt a little of both.[4] In the rocky years that followed a further sorting out occurred and the destinies of entrepreneurs in Parisian trades were unquestionably influenced by the nature of the regime in power. We know few details, but the "merchant tailor," for example, comes into his own during the Empire.[5]

The general history of this "sorting out" of artisan industry, who succeeded in the atmosphere of liberty and who failed, how "liberty" was conditioned by politics and the law, and what were the political responses of winners, losers, and those in between remains to be written. This essay will examine a century of experience with capitalism and the state among artisans of a different sort than the typical Parisian craftsman, but a type whose place in the history of industrial capitalism, the class struggle, and fight for the social and democratic republic was just as important--the textile worker of the old, established industrial towns. The specific focus is on the towns of Lodève and Bédarieux, woolens bourgs in the piedmont region of lower Languedoc. Although both represent success stories of the industrial transition in an otherwise economically battered province, their histories differ enough to be treated as separate examples. They nevertheless share a remarkable history of working-class militancy, in the mid-nineteenth century, one that places these cities of eight to ten thousand souls in a class with Paris, Lyon, or Toulon. There were many other woolens centers like them--Elbeuf, Reims, and Vienne come to mind immediately--and while each of them reveals its nuances, processes of development elsewhere do not seem to have been radically different from these Hérault towns.

By 1851, the reputation of these towns as centers of working-class resistance and démoc-soc politics was solidly established. The battles of the Second Republic capped off a long history, dating back to the early Restoration in the case of Lodève, of virulent class conflict that increasingly took on a political coloration. After flirting with social-Christian politics early in the Revolution of 1848, both saw the growth of worker club movements supporting democratic socialism that became increasingly active as the repression unfolded in 1849. In Lodève, the regional prosecuting attorney (procureur de la République), Paul Adam, paid the ultimate price for his active pursuit of les mauvaises têtes (socialist republicans): he was assassinated in May of 1849. The deed was the result of a carefully articulated

plot that all evidence indicates was charted by the working-class socialist leadership of the city. The guilty parties were not prosecuted until after the coup d'état. Resistance to the latter in Lodève was muted by the presence of a fully-armed garrison installed after the Adam murder. Seventy-two men, overwhelmingly workers from poverty-stricken backgrounds, were nevertheless convicted of resistance to Louis-Napoleon's 18 Brumaire. Bédarieux, if anything, was more famous--because of the resistance. As Ted Margadant has shown in grizzly detail, the insurrection that followed the coup was the most brutally violent in France, with three gendarmes losing their lives in their barracks torched by the crowd and one of the bodies "cooled down" with urine and later castrated. The event had all the earmarks of an urban jacquerie. That the Lodévois, by contrast, did not throw themselves into hopeless combat with the regular army troops stationed in their city (thus salvaging a continuing clandestine democratic movement) is a good indication of their greater maturity and makes good sense in light of their long road to solidarity and organization.[6]

The key goals in what follows are (1) to dissect the process of proto-industrialization in an urban setting and explain why it was important in laying the foundation for working-class solidarity and eventual militancy and (2) to explore the impact of the abolition of guild privileges and assess the significance of capitalism's failed promise for woolens artisans. Throughout I shall stress the contrast in the timing of industrial change in relation to political circumstances in the two woolens centers. Bédarieux ran well behind Lodève in the modernization of its process of production until the very end of the period under analysis when it experienced a quite dramatic surge of industrialization. These differences, I shall argue, go a long way toward explaining greater unity, sophistication, and probity of the movement in Lodève.

In general, I hope to show that the "assault of capitalism" did matter a great deal--but always as it inter-related with state power. Specifically, under the old regime, support from

the Parlement, Estates, and Inspectors of Manufactures of Languedoc paved the way toward Lodève's precocious urban proto-industrialization, while Bédarieux's entrepreneurial elan was released only after the government lifted (largely anti-Protestant) restrictions on the participation of its manufacturers in the Levant trade in the mid-eighteenth century. Then the Revolution unleashed a rash of petty capitalist enterprise followed by state promotion of larger-scale manufacturing under the Consulat and Empire. Lodève, of course, as a manufacturer of cloth for the military, had a special relationship with the state, but solicitous officials in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did all they could to enhance production in Bédarieux as well. Daily experience over the entire century made generations of woolens artisans/workers aware of the integral relationship between capitalism and the state. But perhaps above all they became increasingly aware, as regime followed regime in the nineteenth century, that the Revolutionary vision of equality of economic opportunity and of attendant social equality was a sham. It was not to some idyllic corporative past that they looked, however, for in Lodève the corporative power of the producers was destroyed during the eighteenth century and in Bédarieux it had a quite shaky existence; rather it was to the solidarity of all workers, whatever their craft, and to the associative people's republic in which capitalism would be replaced by socialism.

I. Capitalism, the State, and Proto-industrialization

Lodève's woolens industry in the eighteenth century provides a classic example of the triumph of capitalist practices and the collapse of artisan guilds' ability to protect their interests long before mechanization. The cloth merchant-manufacturers, the fabricants, came to dominate the system of production--and were fully and formally supported by the governments of the old regime at both the provincial and national levels. There seems little question that because the city produced so heavily for the state--Fleury, a Lodévois, had accorded his native town the principal role in army cloth production in

1729--such rationalization took precedence over the maintenance of a key buttress of the old regime's hierarchical system, the corporative order. The very needs of the state, something Turgot understood well, served to undermine its infrastructure.[7] The process can be briefly outlined.[8]

In the earlier seventeenth century, the "marchant-drapiers" were barely more influential than the weavers and cloth finishers (pareurs) and, indeed, were associated with the lowly carders in the same confrérie. Production standards were uneven, a situation that renewed rules seemed unable to improve.[9] But with the Colbertian reforms, things changed rapidly. Certification of drapers and careful quality control by a state inspector became the rule, and only the more substantial gained certification. Employment of Lodève weavers and pareurs by outsiders was restricted by law.[10] The merchant-manufacturers severed their ties with Lodève's carders, leaving the latter as unincorporated wage-workers, and also began to search out carders and spinners in the countryside. The Conseil de Ville (now dominated by the drapers) passed a regulation in 1702 reducing the maximum wage for a male agricultural worker from ten sols per day to nine, females from seven to five. The effect was to make carding and spinning more attractive to the dependent classes in the immediate countryside. To encourage them further, the "fabricants" (they gained that title in 1708) promised "to furnish the tools appropriate to each job." A rural family could thus make 30 sols per day, half again as much as the back-breaking work in the field produced. And if they got the chance to weave--tools generously provided--even more could be gained.[11] Carding and spinning spread quickly into the mountains and causses to the north and west, where it was largely a by-occupation of modest sheep-raisers long accustomed to such work for domestic consumption.[12]

The repercussions of out-working for relations of production in the city were profound. There already existed a deep history of conflict between drapers and both weavers and pareurs. It centered on three issues: the producers' work for outsiders,

their right to change Lodève drapers, and their control over the work process. More recently, access to master status in each guild had become an issue, with the drapers and the artisans each pressing to open the other up while closing their own. Such questions came to a head in a suit against the drapers before the Parlement of Toulouse in 1719. Its decision held that (1) all three guilds had to receive "legitimate aspirants," (2) weavers and pareurs should "prefer" to work for Lodève drapers, but could take outside work if the latter "do not furnish work for them," (3) drapers were permitted to have one master weaver work on their premises for every two that they employed à domicile, and (4) the drapers were not "to trouble the [weavers and pareurs] in the function of their trade." Despite the last, this decision was the opening wedge in the struggle for dominion by the emerging capitalist class of Lodève, and the key to it was the weakened position of the producers due to the advent of cheap rural carding and spinning.[13]

Putting out weaving was initially more difficult. When allowed, it could only be given to guildsmen elsewhere. Hence a first step was to provide work for incorporated Sorgue valley village weavers, hungry for orders with the early eighteenth century decline of the fabrique of St. Affrique. But with the coming of the War of Austrian Succession, the legal supports protecting Lodève weavers fell one by one. Fabricants, flush with army orders and supported by a state unwilling even to investigate weavers' counter-claims, expanded rural weaving rapidly, providing broad-looms for non-guild rural out-workers. Next came the drive by fabricants to force individual master weavers to work for only one manufacturer, which they contrived by offering generous advances. Significant pay differentials began to emerge, despite established piece-rate schedules. Then came the inevitable--the hiring of non-guild weavers in Lodève itself, largely migrants from weaving villages. One can imagine the reception given to these chambrelans by the weavers' community. The Inspectors of Manufactures supported the fabricants'

drive for "free" enterprise. The critical moment came in 1748, after peace reduced demand from 20,000 pieces to 6,000. During the great prosperity of the forties, the established weavers had plenty of work. With the downswing, they mounted their protests, petitioning the Intendant and the Estates of Languedoc--all to no avail. Violent conflict occurred in Lodève, but again the weavers came out the losers.

The merchant-manufacturers' struggle against the pareurs followed a similar pattern, but since rural competition was largely impossible given the skill requirements and locale of the finishing crafts, the path was more difficult. Nevertheless, during the forties, the same policies of entrapment and hiring non-guild workers developed, again to the deaf ear of the government. In refusing to hear a petition from the pareurs, the Inspector General of Montpellier sniffed, "Contract, day, and piece workers of this province would like to lord it over those who give them subsistance." The change reflected in this statement is significant. Master pareurs, treated as virtual equals to the fabricants by the Parlement de Toulouse in 1719, were now identified as mere ouvriers. The authority of capital was not to be challenged. Entrance into the fabricants' guild also became more difficult as the century progressed, above all due to the skyrocketing cost of the mastership fee: 300 livres in 1708, it rose to 1,050 livres by 1749, but with the crucial proviso that the sons of fabricants would be required to pay a mere 200.[14]

Rural carding and spinning were perfectly suited to army production, virtually disappearing in slack times, ballooning in boom periods. The demographic impact of such activity seems to have been minimal. The population in the diocese of Lodève remained stable during the first two-thirds of the century (26,000 in 1698 to 28,521 in 1761 with the city of Lodève just about accounting for the total increase). Balainvilliers gives a clearly inflated figure of 40,000 for 1788, but most of this growth stemmed from the agricultural prosperity of the eastern and southern areas of the diocese. Rural proto-industrializa-

tion did not provoke a major population explosion, as was often the case elsewhere.[15]

Rural weaving, however, posed a different problem. In the majority of villages where the fabricant provided the expensive broadloom, it was inefficient in slack times to leave them in place, but it was a cumbersome and potentially ruinous task to cart them back and forth. One solution would have been to sell them to the part-time rural weavers, but their meager resources made this unlikely, especially when cloth orders were few. The tendency instead was to abandon rural weaving altogether during the years from 1763 to 1778 when army demand fell off substantially. But, critically, fabricants tried to avoid putting weaving out to country workers even after the revival of the trade during the American War (1778-1783). Instead, they were able to attract weavers and other woolens workers from Languedoc cities experiencing difficulties because of the declining Levant trade. Thus 39 out of 47 weavers counted in the census of 1798 who arrived in Lodève after 1778 came from Clermont, Carcassonne, St. Chinian and other depressed regional woolens centers. None came from Bédarieux and Mazamet, then beginning to make headway in the domestic commercial market. One might say the Lodève industry "re-urbanized" during this period.[16]

Lodève weavers themselves had suffered severely during the 1763-78 period. A petition filed in 1771 by some 200 of them condemned cost-cutting operations by the fabricants that forced them to produce more for the same piece rates. Facing old age "à charge à l'hôpital et à la mésericorde," many came to work in the fabricants' ateliers to avoid the "ruinous expenses" of maintaining their own equipment. The war boom reversed their fortunes, but the tendency toward concentration of operations in newly built weaving sheds by or in the fulling mills continued. The old two-for-one code of 1719 was broken during this period, and the independent weavers found their ability to resist concentration more and more difficult.[17] This was also the era when females, long employed by fabricants as washers, sorters, burlers, and spinners, invaded the formerly male-only world of

weaving. Forty-three tisserandes are listed in the census of 1798, which gives female occupations only for heads of households and non-family members. They worked at half the wages of men for both fabricants and master weavers à domicile, largely as seconds on the two-worker broadlooms.[18]

Thus before the Revolution and without the least change in machine technology, Lodève was moving toward the factory system. After a period of industrial dispersion, which served to undermine the power of the urban guilds, its manufacturers were able to concentrate much production again in the city. The social consequences of these shifts in Lodève's political economy were profound. A working class, into which migrants were rapidly integrated, where distance from the owning class became ever greater, and where craft distinctions became less and less important, was in formation.

Marriage and residence patterns allow one to assess the growth of this class cohesion, the social foundation of Lodève's prodigious worker solidarity of the future.[19]

Immigrants have played a variety of roles in the history of working-class formation. The growing literature on the issue points up its complexity. Agulhon and Sewell, though from different perspectives, have underlined the role of migrants in cracking traditional corporative conservatism in Toulon and Marseille. Guillaume, on the other hand, argued that migrants to Bordeaux were seen as culturally inferior job-competitors forming large clusters of aliens in the midst of the "old Bordeaux" laboring classes. Such antagonism seriously undermined solidarity and helps to explain the city's spotty record of labor militancy. Active antagonism need not be present, however, to prevent class integration. In many instances, such as the neighboring textile town of Mazamet, migrants simply formed discrete urban colonies in which their home cultures were maintained and links with their place of origin remained strong. Chain migration, close kin and fellow-countryman ties in the host city, housing segregation, and a general sense of tentativeness about the relationship to the new environment are some

indicators of such a situation.[20] Another migrant type are itinerants who assume that their stay is temporary or who have no choice in the matter. They are simply marginal to the life of the city and the larger their number (as in many fast-growing American cities in the nineteenth century), the less likely is the formation of an integrated working class.

In late-eighteenth century Lodève, however, it is clear that woolens-worker migrants assimilated rapidly.[21] Chain migration (kin or place of origin linkage) rarely occurred. The three Cunienq brothers, all weavers from Riols who came in 1782, 1784, and 1792, are interesting because they are so exceptional. Michael Anderson's migrant kin living in with working class families already established is virtually unknown in Lodève in the 1790s.[22] The only tendency of this order was the case where widowed parents, usually women, came to reside with their children's families long after the children had migrated. Extended family structures in general were rarer among households of migrant heads of all occupations than among Lodévois, unless the migrant had become a homeowner. The only occupational group with some indications of chain migration were agricultural workers.

The great majority of migrants to Lodève arrived as single young adults.[23] They married in Lodève usually after several years of residence. Whom did they marry? With the important exception of agricultural workers, they tended to tie themselves to established Lodève families. Male woolens workers, especially, wed Lodève women, with 80 out of the 108 listed in the census of 1798 who married in the city doing so, and only three of those marrying other migrants wed women from the same pays. All were rough carders who came before 1778. In general, half of the 28 who married other migrants were pre-1778 arrivals. The more recent migrants in the woolens trade, in other words, were considered suitable marriage partners by the families of native Lodève workers.

An analysis of marriage records from September 1796 (An 5) to December 1810 provides corroboration of the census data. Of

the 63 grooms who worked in the woolens industry and had migrated to Lodève, 48 married native Lodévoises. Nine of their fathers were farmers, one a schoolteacher, one a process-server (huissier), four were tradesmen, three were not listed, and the rest (30) were artisans and workers. Among these, twenty-two were woolens workers. Professional migration clearly continued--indeed it appears to have accentuated in the decade after the census. Forty-seven grooms hailed from towns and villages specializing in woolens production and thirty-one out of the 51 of their fathers whose occupations are listed were woolens workers.[24] Equally important, female migrants were acceptable wives for the Lodève-born woolens workers. Seventy per cent in 1898 were married to Lodève-born men. Unlike the men, most of them came from the villages near Lodève and in the causses to the north. Marriage contracts provide examples of why "country girls" might have been desirable marriage partners: their dowries often included revenue from small parcels of their family's land.[25]

Intermarriage figures for woolens workers take on greater significance if compared with other occupational categories. If 74% of unmarried migrant woolens workers married Lodève women, the figures were 66% for building trades artisans and 58% for other artisans and tradesmen; the one matched random expectation, the other fell slightly below it. On the other hand, agricultural workers (brassiers), the largest migrant occupational group at 192, had considerably less luck, finding Lodève wives in only 37% of the cases, thus almost reversing the random choice possibilities.

Where and how woolens migrants lived further demonstrates a process of integration into Lodève's working class. First of all, they comprised 26% of the total woolens-worker population (which was almost exactly one-third of the active male population in 1798), meaning that migrant numbers did not overwhelm the native workers. Overall, Lodève's woolens population grew slowly if steadily, exhibiting little of the mushroom-city syndrome in either the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.

Secondly, woolens migrants settled in occupationally segregated neighborhoods. The four densest areas of woolens worker residency (Alban, 42% of listed occupations; St. Pierre-East, 48%; Faubourg des Carmes, 57%; Faubourg Montbrun, 60%) attracted most of the migrant woolens workers. The last two areas especially, although including only one-fifth of the population of Lodève, provided housing for half the woolens migrants, who moved in cheek to jowl with old Lodévois--in many cases near or in the house of their in-laws. A typical case was that of François Ribal who came from Castres (a woolens town) in 1783 at the age of 18, married Catherine Teissier shortly thereafter and shared, in 1798, three-way ownership of a house in the densely inhabited Faubourg Montbrun with his wife's older sister Françoise, a female weaver, and another unmarried women, also a weaver, who was a member of the Hortolan clan, long-time Montbrun residents. The weaver Noël Cunienq, five doors away, had precisely the same history. The only chain migrants in woolens in Lodève, the Cunienq brothers hardly clung to one another: the other two were in Carmes and St. Pierre and had married into other Lodève woolens families. Neither had yet managed to buy a piece of a house, however.

It is clear, then, that migrant woolens workers of the 1780s and later did not form pockets of outsiders clustering because of kinship or home-town affinity. It was their work that drew them to Lodève and their work that tied them to native Lodévois. Even those who did not marry into the Lodève working class generally lived side by side with people with whom they shared work, not family, experience.

What was the situation of woolens workers in Lodève with respect to home-ownership? Seventy-two percent of all houses in Lodève in 1798 were at least partially owned by a person or persons living there. Absentee landlords there were, but usually they lived in the neighborhood and, if simple name analysis is sufficient, the largest number of dwellings owned or partially owned by one individual was seven, with an estimated total value of around 12,000 francs. And that person,

Pierre Arlès, was not a fabricant, but a 55-year-old propriétaire whose male relatives were professionals and retailers. The second biggest landlord was Clainchar the notary. The bosses of industry were thus not the bosses of residential real estate. Indeed, overall, property ownership in Lodève seems rather widely distributed. According to the census of 1798, 38% of the woolens workers were home owners; of these, however, slightly fewer than half only owned part of a dwelling. Houses in the woolens-worker neighborhoods were small, normally selling for less than a thousand livres (francs). Elaborate subdivision arrangements, with specifications for the use of doors, stairways and kitchen facilities, were detailed in notarized contracts.[26] Overall, about one-third of all dwellings in Lodève were possessed by multiple owners.

Lowest access to home ownership existed among brassiers (agricultural workers), 10% of whom owned a single house and 8% part of one. Artisans and tradespeople enjoyed access ratios similar to woolens workers, while virtually all manufacturers and professionals owned homes, usually single-family dwellings. As a percentage of all homeowners, migrants had a lower access rate than their total percentage in the city, 23% as opposed to 34%. But that of woolens-worker migrants was almost the same as all other woolens workers (37%). Thus they shared a very important characteristic with the woolens population at large. Few woolens workers were rich, but their condition indicates a picture of settlement, stability, and integration in a context of mediocre opportunity.

The following table, drawn from inheritance-tax records (Déclarations des mutations par decès) for the period 1810-14, also reflects the material situation at death of the generation reaching the prime of life in the later eighteenth century.[27]

Table I

Total Declarations with occupation indicated, 1810-1814: 136

Total Woolens Workers: 30

1. No Inheritance (Déclaration négative): 8 men
   - 3 Weavers (Tisserands)
   - 2 Finishers (Pareurs)
   - 2 Twisters (Retorsseurs)
   - 1 Teaseler (Peigneur)*

2. Personal property only (mobilier) (value in francs): 7 men
   - 3 Weavers: 100**, 100, 100
   - 1 Finisher: 200
   - 2 Carders (Cardeur, Embriseur): 400, 216
   - 1 Dyer (Teinturier): 100

3. Possessing Real Estate (Immobilier) (value in francs):

	Total Wealth	Personal Property	Real Estate			
			House	Part of House	Land (Vine)	Land (Other)
Teaseler	100			100 (2 small rooms)		
Carder	400				400	
Finisher	460	20		440 (1/4)		
Spinner (fileuse)	480				480	
Weaver	500	100		200 (large room)	200	
Weaver	575			400	175	
Carder	620					620
Finisher	800	400			400	
Weaver	840	40			800	
Dyer	890		400		490	
Weaver	1188	588			600	
Weaver	1400	300		500	600	
Finisher	2220	200	(2) 2000 (with press)			
Weaver	2500	300	1200		(2) 1000	
Weaver	2800	400	2000 (new)		400	
Master-Dyer	4300	500	3800			
Master-Packer (embaleur)	13000	9000 (Merchandise)	2500		1500	

*During this period, the term equivalent to laineur. Lodève did not produce combed woolens (worsteds).

**In general 100 francs indicates "Vestiaire" (clothing and effects).

To place these figures in some perspective, here are the totals for those listed as "Fabricants" or "Négociants" (who, in Lodève, were always woolens manufacturers):

Table II

	Total Wealth	Personal Property	Real Estate
Fabricant	400	400	
Négociant	3900	400	3500
Négociant	9161	2761	6400
Fabricant	9500	500	9000
Négociant	12016	4016	8000
Fabricant	13560	4740	8820
Négociant	17630	10450	7180
Négociant	40430	900	39530
Négociant	72160	37160	35000
Négociant	109000	94716	15284

With the exception of Rul, a bankrupt small manufacturer (the first listed), all of these men died in a state of some comfort and several were very well off. Fulcran Lagare, whose total wealth topped 100,000 francs, was typical of the elite "fifty families" who dominated the city.

While the "packer" and the affluent dyer were probably independent businessmen and the finisher who owned a press a sub-contractor, the others listed in Table I were very likely all wage-workers. Exactly half of them owned no real estate and a quarter left no inheritance at all. Of the 15 who possessed property, 12 owned land, typically a tiny vinyard, already regarded as a good investment. While a lucky few could buy (or inherit) a house of their own, five of the nine homeowners among them only owned a portion of a house. The impression of mediocre material circumstances and strong attachment to the city rendered by the census is thus corroborated by these more accurate records.[28]

How did the situation of woolens workers compare to other occupational groupings? In terms of inheritable wealth, with

an average of 566F in the declarations of 1810 to 1814, they compared poorly with the artisans and tradespeople who provided for the daily needs of the city.[29] The mean total wealth of the 46 artisans listed was 1486F. The richest of them was a mason at 9860F (he owned two houses, a stable and three valuable vinyards), while four individuals left nothing. As for the other main occupational group in the city, the agricultural workers, the 21 listed in the declarations averaged 1013F, but five were landless and all but six of the others fell below the mean.

In general, agricultural workers were the least integrated group in the city. According to the census of 1798, they accounted almost a fourth of the active population. Unlike woolens workers, migrants among them (58%) tended to cluster in Lodève neighborhoods with fellow villagers and evidence of family chain migration is stronger as well. Although they had the least access to home-ownership of any major occupational group, if they did buy a house or part of a house, they maintained extended families at a rate half again as high as migrant woolens workers, thus exhibiting similarities to the small peasant proprietors in the rural areas to the north from which most of them had come.[30] In short, if, at the end of the eighteenth century, Lodeve included "urban villagers" whose life style and situation differed from the rest of the common folk of the city, they were, not surprisingly, the agricultural workers. On the other hand, Lodève's artisan and shopkeeper population, while generally located in the central city for commercial reasons, had close ties to the woolens workers. The latter were their principal customers and their shops often served as gathering places for socializing and discussion, especially during the Revolution. Moreover, intermarriage between people in woolens and the trades was common.[31]

In general, then, a working class, with some degree of outward cohesion, was beginning to form in Lodève even before 1789. Such was not the case in Bédarieux. In the later eight-

eenth century, an enterprising group of merchant manufacturers, many of them from families of dyers (for Bédarieux had long had the right to dye cloth made elsewhere), moved into the Levant trade at a time when the fortunes of the traditional centers of the industry were declining. Carcassonne, St. Chinian, and especially Clermont had responded to the difficulties posed by shifts in international demand and unscrupulous Marseille shippers by cutting quality. The problem became an epidemic during the brief period of free trade under Turgot, and their reputations never recovered. Bédarieux became virtually the only trusted name by the 1780s. Clermontois were even prosecuted for putting their cloth on the market under Bedarieux's label.[32]

Historically, the organization of the cloth industry in Bédarieux had been rather primitive. In 1713, one merchant-manufacturer, Seymondy, had won the right to establish a privileged manufacture for the Levant trade and organized along typical putting-out lines. In the 1770s and eighties, the Martel brothers developed a centralized establishment for all operations but spinning and weaving and several times demanded the title "royal manufacture." But the typical Bédarieux draper had been little more than a merchant, having agreements with dozens of independent subcontractors, weavers and finishers especially. It was the classic Kaufssystem, which, as James Thomson has argued persuasively, gave verve and freshness to Bédarieux's expanding business community. Only in the last decades before the Revolution did the more successful merchants move toward putting-out patterns.[33]

While the drapers had long had a guild (quality control for government-approved goods had to pass through their jurande), the carders, weavers and finishers did not possess officially recognized corporations. The weavers and finishers had organized confréries, however, and attempted to regulate their trades through these less formal brotherhoods. In the 1780s, weavers, increasingly pressured to work exclusively for one fabricant, sought to tighten the "guild" controls and in 1784 petitioned for recognition as a corporate body. This drive to unite

against the fabricants and to resist the proliferation of weavers who were not members of their confrérie came at the moment when proto-industrial capitalism was coming into its own in the little city. The key problem in the weavers' complaint was the widespread use of weavers in the rural communes of Le Poujol, Colombières, St. Vincent, and Mons, villages down the Orb valley.[34] As in the Lodévois, spinning had long been done in the countryside, but under the charge of independent carders who sold the thread to weavers. Now, however, the fabricants increasingly dominated those operations as well, thereafter putting out the threa to cheaper rural weavers. Thus the Lodève pattern unfolded, but at a fifty-year remove. Bédarieux entered the Revolutionary era just as its rural phase of proto-industrialization was reaching full flower.

II. Petty Capitalism and the French Revolution

The tumultuous debates about the character and impact of the French Revolution, specifically the storms over the "bourgeois revolution," generally overlook an important problem: a phenomenon that might be termed the petit-bourgeois revolution manquée. The abolition of privilege and the new definition of property as "the possession of things by individuals," so expertly analyzed recently by William Sewell, gave hope to tens of thousands of artisans, be they former guild-masters, journeymen, or working people without corporate connections, that the creation of independent, small-scale business enterprise was possible. We know in general that this vision remained unrealized for the vast majority. It is clear that in the long run big capital crushed or absorbed small and that from those shattered dreams and mortgaged futures arose responses that varied from suicidal to revolutionary. But we are ill-informed about the initial impact of economic liberty (or the assumption thereof) during the Revolution and Empire. There is also little concrete understanding of the relationship between the economic policies of post-Thermidorian regimes and the success of larger-scale enterprises, success that obviously contributed to the years of solid economic growth from 1802 to 1810.[35] Most inter-

esting here, was the shift from the mix of economic anarchy and favoritism of the Directory to what one can call a rational-competitive model under the Consulat. The key figure in the development of this new orientation--or at least that man who had to make the key decisions--was Jean-Antoine-Claude Chaptal, Minister of the Interior from 1801 to 1804 and the architect of the Prefectural system.

What happened to the petty-capitalist aspirations of artisan entrepreneurs in Lodève is much better documented, thanks to its special relation to the state, than it is for Bédarieux. The latter's experience can nevertheless be sketched, and the contrast will prove useful in understanding the differing patterns in the development of class-consciousness in each city.

In Lodève the Revolution first stimulated, then dashed the hopes of the ouvriers (as the producers in the woolens industry, whatever their skills or guild status, were called). It is important to stress, in the first place, that the abolition of the guilds on March 2, 1791 generated not a ripple of protest from the workers--a clear indication of how moribund they had become.[36] But the end of corporations decisively changed the character of capitalism in Lodève. For the fabricants, and others like them in Lyon, Sedan, Elbeuf, Louviers, and dozens of other centers where textile manufacturers had largely won the battle for capitalist domination in part by using institutionalized privilege,[37] the d'Allarde law was no doubt greeted with mixed emotions. Now they faced a new world of open competition within their own ranks and, worse, the competition of upstarts from below. There was no doubt that competition was Revolutionary. While we have found no specific remarks of Lodévois on the subject, their neighbors in the nail-making community of Graissessac were explicit in a petition to the National Assembly in 1790 seeking free use of coal deposits in their territory:

> In the sacred name of the public good, in the name of justice and humanity, give to us, Nosseigneurs, the legitimate and necessary usage of our own properties;

> we will serve ourselves for our own good, to be sure, but we do not at all lose sight of the interest of the public as well. For we are fostering competition and competition is the guarantee of the public good.[38]

With the declaration of war in 1792, orders for army cloth boomed. In the Year II, Lodève produced 41,788 bolts for the military alone, the most in its history. The population intra-muros grew by 2,000, as job-seeking workers flocked in, and the countryside in a forty-kilometer radius became a beehive of renewed spinning activity. Most important, there were suddenly 146 fabricants in 85 firms contracting with the government alone while another 50 were involved in other work and waiting in the wings for army orders.[39] Petty capitalism blossomed in Lodève.

Who were these people? As a valuable memoire by fabricant Michel Fabreguettes noted: the new men "are, for the most part, former workers of intelligence who carry out a part of their operations with the aid of their family."[40] Other evidence, especially patente tax records showing the withdrawal of the last of these small-scale fabricants from the industry early in the Restoration and marriage records support this evaluation, as do other subjective comments. The most likely to succeed were dyers and pareurs, although for the younger men listed as fabricants at the time of their marriage (good occupational information only begins in the Year III (1794), fathers or fathers-in-law often are landholders, merchants, or artisans, such as tonneliers, with some capital.[41] The Revolution thus created a degree of equality of opportunity, and many artisans could hope that they too might regain some of the independence their predecessors had had, not through the revival of their corporations, but through the new regime of economic liberty. Privilege was dead; the chance for each to make his way seemed open.

There were real Horatio Alger stories. The two Michel Causses, pere et fils, rose from humble origins (a detractor said the father began as a shepherd and the son was a weaver)

to become the sixth largest contractors in the Year II. The origins of Joseph and J.B. Rouaud were somewhat loftier; they owned dye works under the old regime. They were from the Faubourg Montbrun and attended the St. Pierre parish church, however, thus forever banning them from the polite society of the upper city. Their wealth and influence allowed them to marry their sister to a Fraisse, a poor but honorable fabricant family, and they later made business alliances with well-connected nephews and grand nephews, but they never were invited to join Le Circle, the social club of the town's old elites. The Revolution also opened the way for new bourgeois recruits from outside or from the mercantile and liberal professions of Lodève, with big names of the future such as Barbot, Fournier, Faulquier, and Vitalis making their appearance in the ranks of the manufacturers at this point.[42]

As for the old elite themselves, they generally fared well. The Fabreguettes family, on the brink of disaster in 1789, recouped its economic losses with the Revolution in part by occupying key political posts throughout the Revolution and Empire. Others, such as the Vallat, Teisserenc, Belliol, Salze, Guillaume Rouaud (the respectable branch of the family), Ménard, and Vinas families simply continued earlier prosperity. A severe critic of the nouveaux riches noted nevertheless that virtually all Lodévois industrialists had risen: "none was worth more than 200,000 livres in 1789. By 1794 there were 5 or 6 millionaries and 40 with fortunes of 200,000."[43] The old elites dominated their ranks.

Politically, Lodève was republican by interest if not necessarily by taste. Woolens workers had been enthusiastic about the Revolution from the beginning and became more so, perfect sans-culottes in fact. The Vallat, Vinas, Belliol crowd carried off a municipal revolution of sorts in 1789 against the authority of the bishop of the civil diocese of Lodève. Some of them, Jansenists and even deists, supported the abolition of the bishopric altogether and the installation of a constitutional curé in the former Cathedral.[44] This pro-

cess infuriated the orthodox Catholics, who comprised about a third of the old elite. Fulcran Lagare, Guillaume Rouaud, the Beaupilliers, and the Clainchards, future *importants* during the Restoration, were their leaders. Michel Fabreguettes and Joseph Rouaud then emerged in 1791 and went on to serve as concillators through the trying days ahead. The true rags-to-riches types, such as Michel Causse, pere, then became the key political actors during the Terror. While he and his friends were attacked by the royalist right after Thermidor, they in fact protected the old bourgeoisie from serious injury. There was not a single execution in Lodeve during the Terror.[45]

But the Year II was also the heyday of the little folk in the industry. In a precious "Relevé des soummissions des Fabricants de Lodève pour la fourniture de 1793 à 1794 (Style Esclave)," 85 "Soumissionaires" (about one-third including more than one individual) are listed; 45 have names new to the ranks of the fabricants (compared to a list from 1785) and 37 of these are from families whose artisan origins are either known (21) or surmised by virtue of the fact that their production consignment was small. The other 8 have been identified through notarial and later *mutation* records as Lodève bourgeois from outside the industry (Rouch and Barbot) or bourgeois from elsewhere. Of the 37 former artisans, 28 produced 200 bolts or less for the military in the Year II. Assuming nearly constant activity, this means that they were employing only five "master" weavers on a regular basis (one *demi-pièce*--aunes, 1700 warp-threads--per two-person loom per week was normal) and, if they were lucky, clearing a profit of perhaps 2500 livres, while a hard-working weaver and his family could make one-third that much.[46] Ten of these "firms" (two with two partners) contracted for between 100 and 130 bolts and there were another 50 fabricants with no army orders at all. Clearly, then, there were a substantial number of marginal operators who nevertheless stood apart in status and income from the average worker family of weavers. Still, with just a bit of capital, the latter might make the step up.

The small entrepreneur sought to cut costs wherever possible. It was later revealed that the smallest of them worked on a contract basis for larger ones and several were notorious for cheating on quality. More normal, however, was their frenetic search for cheap labor. While Lodève generally maintained its predilection for the use of skilled, settled, local weavers, there was a recrudescence of part-time weaving in the countryside.[47]

Some idea of the operations of a small-scale fabricant can be gained from the bankruptcy proceedings in 1823 against Jean-Louis Cauvy, who established himself during the Revolution. While the detailed history of his business runs from 1819 to 1823 (bankruptcy court demanded an accounting of operations for the five-year period before declaration), Cauvy's firm used traditional methods and manufactured almost exactly 200 bolts of cloth per year, hence making him comparable to the petty capitalists of the Revolutionary period. He was in fact simply one of the last small firms to collapse.[48]

Cauvy's ownership of real estate was somewhat more substantial than many of his Revolutionary counterparts; his house was worth 5,000 francs. Typically, he also had two terres vignes near the city and used his house as his "factory." There he employed three to five hand-jenny spinners and, intermittently, wool sorters. All other operations were put out. Weaving was the major expense and he used four to eight tisserands à domicile depending on need. All finishing activities were done either by one of the few remaining independent artisans (Cadilhac et frères, pareurs, received 150 francs "pr compte sur leur ouvrage" on July 20, 1819, for example) or by large companies (packing and shipping was done by Michel Fabreguettes). When needed, Cauvy also bought machine-spun thread from large companies. He sought weavers both in Lodève and outside and, as he slipped toward bankruptcy, went further and further afield to locate cheap weaving. But his main activity appears to have been the relentless search for wool at good prices. He had dozens of sources--local fabricants who were overstocked,

sheep-growers in the nearby hills and causses, and major wool merchants in Montpellier.

Finally, Cauvy bought on credit and borrowed heavily. His major debts were to local fabricants acting in the capacity of short-term bankers, but he also used the services of two major Montpellier financial houses, Mourgue and Vidal et Querrelle, who regularly advanced Lodève fabricants money against their pending military orders. But Cauvy had gone consistently beyond his assured return. Moreover, both his house and lands were mortgaged. In the end, the amount owed in interest alone (some seven thousand francs in 1822) was more than double his gross income. In his last year of operation he tried every conceivable method of cost-cutting. The lower wages and the constant turnover of people working both in his shop and outside indicate that the vicious circle of employee exploitation, quality deterioration, and ever-fewer sales had taken over.

In all likelihood, Cauvy's business operations approximated that of many petits-fabricants of the Revolutionary era. And most, despite the glorious promise of the Year II, came to the same sorry end.

After Thermidor, Lodève's Jacobin reputation did not serve it well. Etienne Thorel, the mayor installed after the Federalist revolt in the Hérault was put down, Louis Arrazat, his adjoint, and Joseph Rouaud, a commissaire for the department, were all supporters of Robespierre and all upstart fabricants. Michel Causse, père, was widely regarded as the grey eminence of local Jacobinism, although he managed to maintain his political influence during the reaction. A long letter dated 5 nivose an III (December 26, 1794) from an arch-Royalist who identified himself only as "Cincinnatus," as vituperative as it was well-documented, seems to have had an effect. Orders to Lodève were cut early in 1795, and shortly thereafter the government embarked on a new policy that ended the town's preferred status as an army supplier: supply contracting under the Directory was to be carried out by huge companies whose business it was to find the lowest bids possible. Quality was to be borne in mind, but

profit margins of Amelin-VanRobais, Musset, and Cavillier, the companies that succeeded one another as supply agents (with each outdoing the next in shady practices), were dependent upon rock-bottom prices and volume purchases.

Lodève, already smarting from disastrous losses because of currency devaluation, now faced certain decline, for the basis of its reputation had long been high quality at a moderate price. Some of the small fry willing to produce "cheap and nasty" survived, because, according to Michel Fabreguettes, Musset, especially, encouraged big manufacturers to become jobbers. Writing in 1801, he said:

> During the last three or four years, the fabrique has been in one way or another stifled or, better said, several greedy fabricants, who also have more monetary resources than the others, finding greater advantage in the resale of cloth than in its manufacture, are eager for commissions only to have the occasion to buy cloth, and the fabricants from whom they obtain it at low prices cut corners on quality. This commerce, a true agiotage, and the events that have pushed wool prices up beyond appropriate limits have caused the painful change for the worse that the draps de Lodève have experienced.

At that point, only 110 fabricants "with more or less extensive operations" still survived. Finally, the government of the Directory had fallen massively behind in its payments, further wracking all suppliers. Poverty stalked the entire region and crime and brigandage skyrocketed (though the Lodévois hardly had a monopoly on either).[49]

The Consulat saved the day for the industry--but also, by virtue of its new policy of awarding contracts only in large lots and payable only upon arrival in Paris, it delivered the coup de grace to the struggling petty capitalism of Lodève. It did not die without a fight, however, and it was paternalist, democrat, and suspected Jacobin Michel Fabreguettes and his brother Pierre, the first Sous-Préfet of the new Arrondissement de Lodeve, who led the charge.

A flurry of letters between rival Lodevois and the Ministry of the Interior reveals a fascinating tale.[50] Fabreguettes, the

richest of all Lodève's fabricants, had been virtually alone in bidding for army orders for the Year VIII (awarded in August 1799). The non-payment for the orders of the previous year and the collapse of credit during 1799 frightened Lodève's other key fabricants, who sought markets in the private sector instead. He demanded, and got, a higher price than in the past, convincing the War Department that the quality of clothing for France's armies had fallen so spectacularly that replacement costs threatened to become staggering. It was also well-documented that general officers, who placed the orders and controlled the financing, were simply pocketing the money while demanding delivery. Fabreguettes could afford to be brave, however, and gathered support from many small fabricants for whom he promised orders if they promised high-quality work. He railed against the jobbers and the contractors and the corrupt practices of the past.

After 18 Brummaire his family came to the attention of the new regime. But Fabrequettes, paternalist defender of the small, was also seeking to dominate the process of army cloth supply from Lodève. He set himself up in 1800 as the national agent through whom the supply process would operate and promised to make sure that the five dozen small fabricants--his family's key political base--would get orders. They offered effusive support for Bonaparte and won the praise of the Consulat's first Minister of War, Lazare Carnot. The political logic of it all was clear. But such "paternalist-democratic" favoritism did not sit so easily with the new Minister of the Interior, Chaptal.

Born in the Lozère and educated in Montpellier, he was a friend of the south and a Federalist saved from the guillotine by some Jacobin allies. But above all he was a scientist and a businessman (unquestionably one of the great applied chemists of the age) with a large company in Montpellier. He was probably well-acquainted with Lodève's prominent business families, including the Fabreguettes. He was also a solid Republican. There might be reason to think that he would lend support to the Fabreguettes plan, for it would satisfy a substantial block of middle-

level supporters of the new government, which at that point billed itself as the progressive defender of justice against the "corruption" of the Directory. But the Fabreguettes program offered neither guarantees as to quality or delivery nor an organizational structure that could respond quickly to demand. More important, Fabreguettes was proposing a monopoly. Thus it was that Chaptal, whose political sympathies (and, it seemed, the Consulat's political interest) might have led him to support Fabreguettes, did not. Instead he successfully engineered a framework of competition among relatively large and efficient units of production articulated by two competitive umbrella organizations also competing to handle overall financing and delivery operations.

In the first place, Chaptal was careful not to seem overly sympathetic to Lodève. Carnot had favored sending a relief fund to Lodève and reorienting the bulk of the army orders there. Lucien Bonaparte, writing a long letter on 4 Brumaire an IX (October 25, 1800) to Carnot, made it clear that he opposed such favoritism. Chaptal, when he came into office shortly thereafter, wisely rejected a specifically pro-Lodève policy. But by mid-summer 1801, several months after an official site-visit stressing the extreme poverty and threats to public order found in the city, Lodève regained its role as principal supplier. This is the point at which the struggle over the supply process was engaged. Fabreguettes seemed to have the inside track, but thirty-five of the foremost manufacturers of the city, almost all members of the city's pre-Revolutionary fabricant elite or respectable newcomers such as Gaspard Barbot (the future father-in-law of Michel Chevalier), formed an association that would serve to coordinate the supply mechanism, but maintain the warehouse in Lodève. This meant that payment to individual fabricants would be made promptly by the association, although it would collect from the government only upon actual delivery of 2000-bolt lots in Paris. Members contracted with the association a volume of production proportional to their number of shares in the association. The

latter were not in money but in cloth--3000 francs' worth per share. These shares would be renewable deposits, maintained at the warehouse as a kind of guarantee of delivery.[51] The largest number of shares was twenty, held by Pierre Ménard and J.A. Visseq, two of the city's wealthiest men, the smallest four, held by Louis Teisserenc and Petrarch, fils, both young members of prominent families. On one hand the association assured the participation of a larger number of fabricants in the military trade (Parisian delivery of half-lots of 1000 bolts, the smallest quantity acceptable under the new standards, would have been possible for only four or five manufacturers), but on the other included only people whose volume of business was substantial enough to ensure consistent levels of quality and regular supply. It was socially exclusive as well, for not only did it ban four or five dozen struggling small operators, but successful upstarts Joseph and Jean-Baptiste Rouaud and Michel Causse as well. The latter, however, along with the Fabreguettes and Guillaume Rouaud of the old elites, had sufficient capital to treat directly with the government, and were prepared to do so.

Economically, the association made sense. Politically, it represented the conservative forces in the city: its leaders were vigorous anti-Jacobins (save for Jean Benoit, whose father held office during the Terror but had earlier been a "federalist deputy to Montpellier"),[52] and Ménard, Visseq, Soudan and Captier were solid orthodox Catholics. Practically speaking, however, they represented the social backbone of the old city and as long as they were getting government orders, they would support any regime in power. And clearly, the guarantees that they could collectively offer made them a better bet than Michel Fabreguettes.

The latter and his brother rested their appeal on social justice, citing the exclusiveness of the association and the role of many of its members in promoting the abuses of the past. Michel claimed that during his stewardship in the dark final years of the Directory, he had fought these abuses, while pro-

moting the "honest majority" who were presumably truer sons of the Revolution, small fabricants who did not cheat.

Early in July 1801, Chaptal wrote a letter to the Mayor of Lodève endorsing the Association of the Thirty-five. He had it read to an assembly of all Lodève's fabricants; angry recriminations followed and order was barely maintained. Further correspondence revealed that Chaptal was not favoring the Thirty-five, but the concept: "nothing is stopping the individuals who comprise the majority from making similar offers and in such case they can be assured that I will support them with all my influence."[53] The problem, then, was that Fabreguettes' association was guaranteed only by his own undeniably significant wealth and credit and by the political position of his brother. Chaptal was encouraging him to organize along the lines of the Thirty-five--which would mean including only substantial, "principal" fabricants. Fifteen of the latter, however, soon joined the other group. And in a letter from J.B. Salze, the secretary of the Thirty-five (now Fifty), the association made it clear that they rejected a "general union" of fabricants as "impractical," but would "welcome Febreguettes personally" in their midst.[54]

In the end, Fabreguettes, good businessman that he was, relented and formed an association similar to that of the other group. It included the other major, and ostracized, fabricants, the Rouaud brothers and Causse, and a handful of smaller manufacturers who could manage to buy at least four shares. As for the micro-fabricants who could not afford to immobilize 12,000 francs' worth of material, they had nowhere to go except into the difficult commercial market (where only the very highest quality broadcloth was selling) or, more likely, into the production of knitwear for the army. Most seem to have struggled on into the Empire and survived mainly on the latter. But they were no longer true fabricants and their entrance into that class was now most improbable.

Lodève did well, of course, throughout the war years, although non-payment by the government became a growing problem.

The association method of bidding gave way quickly (before Chaptal left office in 1804, in fact) to a system that would remain throughout the nineteenth century: for all but the very wealthiest families, the use of shifting partnerships of major manufacturers that bid for quarter-lot orders (or multiples thereof) became the rule. The state continued to demand large orders and post-payment--meaning that only capitalists with high volume operations and good credit did business with it. The petty-capitalist age of opportunity was over.

Chaptal, not at all opposed in principle to equality of opportunity, nevertheless followed a policy that discouraged petit-bourgeois aspirations in Lodève. He consistently promoted competition, first resisting Fabreguettes' attempts to monopolize the trade and then encouraging him to compete with the others by copying their big-business organizational structures, while he sought rationalization of the industry by making certain that small fabricants--accused of cheating on quality and known for late delivery--were forced out altogether. And here, the concept of rational competition overruled his inherent political beliefs.

The response to these developments was complex. The industry underwent further rationalization and, for the first time, some degree of mechanization. Hand-carding was the first to go, but, pioneered by Causse, spinning machinery was introduced after 1809. Most important, however, because of the collapse of the small fabricant, independent sub-contracting artisans, especially the proud pareurs, faced uncertain futures. But the decade after 1800 was also perhaps the most prosperous in Lodeve's history, despite growing irregularity of payment, and the material impact of the process just described was not disastrous. Still, we can discern a massive change in the ranks of the elite artisans, a levelling that seems critical in the final demise of an artisanat in Lodève woolens. Analysis of marriage records from 1796 through 1810 allows one to glimpse what was happening to pareurs and tondeurs. First of all, it

appears that the word pareur was increasingly used in reference to young men actually performing the task of a tondeur, that is cropping napped cloth. Formerly, each workshop had a pareur who oversaw the entire operation--examining the fulled cloth, determining the intensity and number of napping and cropping operations and serving as the lead cropper (hand-cropping was a two-man activity) in the final stages of the process. If he were an independent sub-contractor, he was in fact the boss and either rented or owned his own finishing room in the fulling mill or elsewhere. But even as an employee of a fabricant, he was, as it were, the tondeur-en-chef, with teaselers (peigneurs) and other tondeurs beneath him. But, amazingly, after Messidor an 10 (June-July 1803), the word tondeur is not again used in describing the occupation of a groom in a marriage record, only "pareur." Obviously, most of those described are in fact lesser croppers, tondeurs, especially if they are young men. The word pareur--and no doubt the job--was losing its distinction.

Equally important was the flight from the occupation by the sons of pareurs (and tondeurs) and the large number of "outsiders" who filled their elders' shoes. Of the thirty fathers listed as pareurs (25) or tondeurs (5) whose sons married between 1796 and 1810, only fourteen saw their sons follow them in their craft. The other sixteen included only three woolens workers (a napper, a weaver, and a twister), one stockinger, five farmers, and four artisans. Only two seemed to be upwardly mobile, a 25-year old fabricant who married a process-server's daughter and a 55-year old retired officer (a widower) marrying a lime-burner's wodowed daughter. Twenty-nine other grooms were tondeurs (8) or pareurs (21). Three of their fathers were weavers, one a napper, two fabricants, one a ship's captain, one a stockinger, one a hatter, six service artisans, and six farmers (five were unknown). The fathers-in-law of all forty-three were similarly diverse: only five were pareurs/tondeurs, while thirteen worked in the lower orders of the woolens industry and the rest in a similar range

of crafts and agricultural work as the fathers.

In contrast, weavers--a job in demand and whose status had not changed significantly of late--had high rates of occupational continuity and endogamy. Seventy-eight out of 109 (72%) weavers toasted weaver sons on their wedding day, while only 29 fathers of weavers came from other crafts, and 27% of the grooms married the daughters of weavers. We do not yet witness heavy intermarriage between the elite craft families and the lesser woolens crafts, but clearly their craft status was slipping and their sons were moving on to other work, abandoning the job to others.[55]

In time, the croppers would revolt--beginning with the fight against the infernal gig mill in 1819. But the older generation was largely gone; craft pride was no doubt still there, but much of the haughtiness was gone. Certainly they welcomed the support of weavers in their struggles and in return gave them theirs in the weavers' battles from 1824 on. These were workers without illusions about craft status.[56]

They were also people who could remember well the failed promise of capitalism during the Revolution. They, the weavers, and the others hoped that small enterprise might work. It seemed to spark during the Jacobin era, but was then snuffed out by the "agiotage" of the later nineties and "rational competition" of the Consulat. By the teens and twenties, they were facing mechanization, the factory system, and a caste of fabricants who daily made them understand that capitalist society was a two-class system and they were on the bottom. The objective factors of class cohesion soon gave way to class consciousness and class resistance.

But during the Empire itself, the most consistent expression of class feeling came in the area of religion. A by-product of Jacobinism that did not sit well with many Lodève woolens workers was the closing of the parish church of Saint-Pierre in the heart of their sector of the city (the lower town and the faubourgs of Montbrun and Carmes across the rivers). The Constitutional services were held at the former cathedral, St. Fulcran, historically the stronghold of the fabricant elites.

While many of Lodève's common folk did not oppose the constitutional church in principle, the suppression of St. Pierre and especially the popular confréires of the Blue and the White Penitents that met there upset woolens workers, particularly the large number of women who toiled in the industry. Popular piety had a deep tradition in the city, and its manifestation was an important mode of self-expression among the lower orders. The concordat of 1801 brought the seething resentment out into the open and the masses of Lodève even gave heavy support to the installation of a former non-juring priest as the curé of St. Fulcran. Above all, however, there were popular demonstrations supporting the reopening of St. Pierre and the revival of the ancient confréries. This was accomplished the following year and the city settled into a framework of two religious camps that matched its class structure. It is important to emphasize that popular Christianity remained a significant element in Lodève's working-class consciousness until 1848, when the workers gave overwhelming support to a republican-socialist priest named Vallibouze in his candidacy for the National Assembly.[57]

The history of Bédarieux during the Revolution provides a notable contrast to that of Lodève and an excellent example of a situation where the ostensibly progressive political thrust of the French Revolution threatened to destroy equally progressive economic development. Bédarieux succeeded as a woolens manufacturing town despite the Revolution, and its politics reflected this fact.

The Revolution occurred at a moment when its energetic capitalists had just established their reputation as the most reliable producers of draps de Levant. They had also just won their suit abrogating the claims of local weavers to guild status. Thus a process almost inverse to that of Lodeve unfolded. The abolition of the guilds was meaningless for all concerned, because the jurande of fabricants had never been terribly strong. Most of the fabricants were comparative newcomers to the business. The local bourgeoisie was young and

fluid. But the key fact was the rapid collapse of the Mediterranean trade, especially after the declaration of war. This meant that the town's enthusiasm for the Republic, indeed the Revolution as a whole, was less than ecstatic. There was one segment that greeted it warmly--the Protestant minority. Moreover, a variety of non-Protestant small merchants and artisans, sans-culottes, became enamored of revolutionary ideals. But for the town's top elites, the Catholic fabricants such as the Vernazobres, Martel, or Fabrégat, the Revolution had caused nothing but trouble, although at the very beginning they had welcomed the business freedom that it seemed to promise.[58] Moreover, artisans in the woolens industry felt the recent loss of their independence and steady income all the more with the definitive end of the guilds and the depressed conditions of trade. They were hardly in a position to invade the ranks of the fabricants, as had been the case in booming Lodève. But the tradition of innovation remained strong. A new product, mi-soie, mi-laine (warp in wool, weft in silk), found a ready internal market and also escaped the maximum when it was imposed in 1793. Moreover, Bédarieux won some army contracts. But the fact remained that the number of successful partnership firms in the city remained small (only 14 were listed in a survey in late 1794, though several independent small fabricants were not included), and resentment toward the upheaval in trade caused by the Revolution was strong.[59]

So, in a word, Bédarieux became a hotbed of Royalism. The initial catalyst was the imposition of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which was resisted furiously. With the coming of the Republic and the levée en masse, Bedarieux and its westward hinterland, the wild mountains of the Espinouse, became a battleground between bands of royalists, often led by priests, and recruiting officers. Indeed a mini-Vendée existed in the mountains, and Bédariciens, notably from the Fabrégat family, were among the counter-revolutionary leaders. This situation continued throughout the decade. By the time of the coup d'état, the area was a royalist stronghold where conscription, for example, was simply ignored.[60]

The Protestants of Bédarieux made up no more than 10% of the population and consisted of about a dozen fabricant families, a few members of the liberal professions, and a wide variety of artisans and retail merchants. There were few woolens workers among them, meaning that the bulk of the city's working class was Catholic and, with the immigration of the nineteenth century, would become more so. For Protestant businessmen, although toleration had been accorded before the end of the old regime, the Revolution opened new vistas. A good example were the Bompaires, a family of mule traders originally from Graissessac, the only other Protestant enclave in the area, several of whom entered the woolens industry during the Revolution. By and large, Protestant businessmen, working in the relatively depressed climate of the Revolution that had aided them politically, found that innovation and discipline were the keys to success. Neither would make them popular with workers whether in town or country, who were overwhelmingly Catholic. While Protestants were not the only nouveaux-arrivés of the Revolutionary period--the Catholics Sicard and Prades were more successful than any Protestant--they undoubtedly came in for more than their share of antagonism from workers. Cholvy and others have shown that in general Catholic consciousness was heightened by the presence of even a small minority of Protestants.[61] If they are also one's boss, the tendency can only be accentuated. Popular Catholicism/royalism was thus very strong in Bédarieux and one sees little of the anti-establishment, class-based popular piety that existed in Lodève. At this point, weavers, finishers, and the rest of the woolens workers in Bédarieux seemed politically in tune with the majority of their bosses, reserving their hatred for a select few of them largely because of their religion. The opium did its work well, in other words, in Bédarieux.

We do not have a census for Bédarieux similar to the magnificent document taken in 1798 in Lodève, so detailed analysis of the town's population is more difficult. Two points of interest, however, can be drawn from marriage records analysed from 1794 through 1813. First, although the numbers were smaller than Lodève, a similar

proportion of in-migrant male woolens workers marrying in the city found local wives (26 of 32 or 81%), and most came from other woolens cities and villages. Living arrangements are not clear, but some descriptive evidence would suggest that there was little neighborhood segregation along social lines. Rather it was religious, with the Protestants clustering around their temple. There was only one Catholic parish, at that point, in the city, and the upper class faubourg of the nineteenth century had not yet been built. Secondly, craft exclusivism appears strong. Rather remarkably, the sons of all of 24 Pareurs/Tondeurs who were fathers of grooms in Bédarieux weddings from 1794 through 1813 followed in their father's footsteps. And those young men who entered the elite crafts (especially that of pareur, which retained its over-sight function, as best we can determine, until the early 1830s) came from rather elevated backgrounds and married well.[62] None of the breakdown evident in Lodève was occurring, therefore.

The Catholic-royalist tradition and the continuation of craft-consciousness predict to a relatively conservative woolens worker community in Bédarieux, which indeed remained the case until the period of rapid industrial development during the 1830s. But corporative traditions there were also weak and the town's manufacturers were innovative and dedicated capitalists. The keys to Bédarieux's emergent class-consciousness, when it grew in the late 1830s and forties, would therefore be the break with the fabricants' Catholic paternalism on one hand and, on the other, the transformation of the organization of production that accompanied the implantation of a true factory system in the 1830s. These cannot be detailed here,[63] but Bedarieux seems typical of dozens of "new" factory towns of 19th century France. Its working class was somewhat more precocious (and virulent) in its resistance to capitalism than those of Alsace or the Nord, but compared with the long and deep confrontation that unfolded in nineteenth century Lodève, it takes on that allure.

* * * * * * * *

The fine mesh in the net of local social history allows one to capture aspects of historical change that would otherwise go unnoticed. Local/regional study is also sufficiently circumscribed to allow the historian to deal with change over a long period of time. We thus tend to ignore traditional historical periodization, such as the classic break-point of 1789. At the same time, the social historian cannot disregard "great events," "great men," and "key turning points." What we are interested in, after all, is understanding the historical process.

It seems to me that this paper points up the value of merging both sorts of history and consciously eschewing time-capsules. I have questioned generalizations about "artisans" from several different angles. First, there is the importance of eighteenth-century capitalist industrialization (somehow the prefix "proto" reduces the significance of what happened): it smashed the corporative world of Lodève's artisans, especially the weavers. What was left of the "corporate mentality" resided in the elite finishing craft; its last gasp was short-lived, however, and when one examines the cropper population that would battle against the gig-mill, a majority are first-generation croppers whose "corporative" values, if they existed, were certainly not instilled by family tradition. Capitalism in 18th-century Bédarieux also wrought important changes, but in developing rural proto-industrialization, it actually tended to stimulate craft defenses among the urban weavers and finishers. Bédarieux is interesting, however, because there the guild system was very weak, so again, corporative values were unlikely to be very significant in the mind-set of its artisans. Neither town therefore had "typical" artisans in their woolens industries--they simply do not fit generalizations, such as those of Sewell, about the artisan world that take the urban service crafts as their model. The problem with such generalizations is that they do not take account of the rather massive growth of industrial capitalism in eighteenth-century France.

Secondly, there is the petty-capitalist revolution stimu-

lated by the abolition of the guilds in 1791. Lodévois artisans jumped at the chance to become independent fabricants; far from condemning capitalism, they embraced it. But their dreams were not realized and many others who never even had the chance also understood that opportunity was not as equal as they had been led to believe by Revolutionary rhetoric. The experience with capitalism and the failure of its promise unquestionably was a key factor in developing a worker's outlook opposing it. Artisan nostalgia was not a part of this mentality.

Thirdly, such study allows one to look in concrete detail at the interplay between political power and economic development. In the 18th century, both provincial and royal officials, obviously supporters of the hierarchical values of the Old Regime, willingly participated in the destruction of one of its key supports, the guild system. They did so in the name of economic progress, which would enhance the glory of the province and the power of the nation-state. The contradiction is obvious and was critical in the downfall of the regime. But the bourgeois state ushered in with the Revolution revealed very early its own contradictions as it unleashed a flurry of capitalist activity among artisans--often aided by political positioning--and then made their chance for success increasingly remote. A new form of privilege, that of mere wealth, was becoming evident. These artisans, now workers, came to know that this state was also their enemy.

Notes

*Many thanks to the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and Wayne State University for grants supporting my research on Languedoc.

[1]See especially, William Sewell, Jr., Work and Revolution in France (1980); Bernard Moss, The Origins of the French Labor Movement (1976); Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, Rebellious Century (1973) and Ch. Tilly, Contentious Frenchmen (1983); Ronald Aminzade, Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism: a Study of Nineteenth-Century Toulouse (1981); Christopher H. Johnson, "Economic Change and Artisan Discontent: The Tailors' History, 1800-1848," in R. Price, ed., Revolution and Reaction (1975), 87-114; Octave Festy, Le Mouvement ouvrier francais de 1830 a 1834 (1912); Georges Duveau, 1848 (1962); Maurice Agulhon, Toulon, une ville ouvrière autemps du socialisme utopique (1970); Jacques Rancière, La Nuit des Prolétaires (1979); Stephen Marglin, "What do Bosses do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production," Union of Radical Political Economists (Summer 1974); Jean Monds, "Workers' Control and the Historians: a New Economism," New Left Review (May-June 1976); David Montgomery, Workers Control in America (1979); Michael Hanagan, The Logic of Solidarity (1978); James Hinton, The First Shop-Stewards' Movement (1973).

[2]Rancière, "The Myth of the Artisan," International Labor and Working-Class History (Fall 1983), 1-16; "Responses" by Sewell and Johnson in the same issue and "A Reply" by Rancière, ILWCH (Spring 1984), from which the quotation is taken (p. 42).

[3]Steven L. Kaplan, "Social Classification and Representation in the Corporate World of Eighteenth Century France: Turgot's 'Carnival,'" forthcoming in Kaplan and C. Koepp, eds., Work in France (1985).

[4]R.M. Andrews, "Politics and Social Structure in Revolutionary Paris," paper delivered at Duke University, The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, February 16, 1984.

[5]Johnson, "The Tailors' History," 90-1.

[6]Margadant, French Peasants in Revolt (1979), 279-82. Full analysis of the growth of the revolutionary movement in the woolens towns of the Hérault will appear in my book, The Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc, scheduled for publication with Oxford University Press in 1985. See also, Sylvia Vila, "Luttes populaires dans le departement de l'Hérault, 1830-1834," in Droite et Gauche en Languedoc-Roussillon (1975) and Frank Manuel, "La Grève des tisserands de Lodève en 1845," Revue d'histoire moderne (1935), 209-225 and 353-372.

[7]Kaplan's remarkable article, cited in note 3, stresses this contradiction. It demonstrates that the very efforts to save the monarchy would destroy the buttresses that supported it.

[8]The following analysis of Lodève's eighteenth-century industrial history has appeared previously in my article, "De-industrialization: the Case of the Languedoc Woolens Industry," written for the International Conference of Economic History, Budapest, 1982 (Section A 2) and published in Quaderni storici, 18 (aprile 1983), pp. 29-33.

[9]Ernest Martin, ed., Cartulaire de la Ville de Lodève (Montpellier, 1900) (hereafter CVL), 335, 312-60.

[10]Ibid., 375-86; E. Martin, Histoire de la Ville de Lodève (Montpellier, 1900), II, 201.

[11]Ibid., 236; CVL, 340.

[12]Ibid., 410-12. Marres, Les Grandes Causses, II, 44-51, 66-80; Leon Dutil, L'Etat économique du Languedoc à la fin de l'ancien régime (1750-1789) (Paris, 1911), 243-53, 289-92.

[13]CVL, 404-07.

[14]The key studies are Emile Appolis, Un pays languedocien au milieu du XVIII[e] siecle: le diocèse civil de Lodève, étude administrative et économique (Albi, 1951); Martin, Histoire de la Ville de Lodève, II, 250 ff.; and Leon Dutil, L'Etat économique du

Languedoc (1750-89) (Paris, 1911), 277-444. See the correspondence and reports of Henri Sauclières and J.B. Tricou, the local inspectors of manufactures during the 1740s and 1750s, ADH, C 2500, 2501, and 2502; also C 2792. This same trend forms the principal theme of Maurice Garden's fine study, Lyon et les lyonnais au XVIII^{e} siecle (Paris, n.d.), especially 582-92.

[15]See Rudolph Braun, Industrialisierung und Volksleben (Winterthur, 1960) and David Levine, Family Formation in an Age of Nascent Capitalism (New York, 1977). For Lodève, see C. Rolland, "Recherches démographique et sociales sur Lodève au XVIII^{e} siecle," D.E.S. Histoire (Montpellier, n.d.).

[16]Recensement de l'An VI, Archives Communales de Lodeve (ACL), 1F2. "Etat de fabrique," 2 octobre 1824, ACL 2 F 6; Plaintes et Placets, ADH, C 6766 and 6767; "Les tisserands de Lodève aux citoyens composants la Commission des subsistances à Paris" (An II), A.N. F^{12} 1389-90; "Vols de Fabrique," ACL 2 I 10.

[17]ADH, C 6766.

[18]Recensement de l'An VI, ACL, 1 F 2.

[19]The main source for what follows is the "Recensement de l'an VI," found in Lodève's communal archives, 1 F 2. It is a remarkable document, for besides the normal information (name, age, sex, household, house, and occupation of heads of household and adult male residents), it provides commune of origin, approximate date of migration to Lodève, and ownership information on the dwelling.

[20]William Sewell, "Social Change and the Rise of Working-Class Politics in Nineteenth-Century Marseille," Past and Present (Nov. 1974), 75-109; Maurice Agulhon, Une Ville ouvrière au temps du socialisme utopique: Toulon, 1815-1851 (Paris, 1970); Pierre Guillaume, La Population de Bordeaux au XIX^{e} siècle (Paris, 1972); and Andre David, La Montagne Noire (Carcassonne, 1924). For a general survey and good bibliography on problems relating to

migration, see Charles Tilly, "Migration in Modern European History," CRSO Working Paper no. 145, University of Michigan, 1976.

[21]ACL, 1 F 2.

[22]See Michael Anderson, Family Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire (New York, 1971).

[23]The average age of migration was 23 for males, 24 for females (the latter influenced by old women migrants mentioned earlier). Among all occupational groups, married male arrivals constituted only 12%, although for non-building trades artisans and tradespeople the figure was 17% of all married men in 1798. The figure for woolens workers was 15 out of 123 or 12.2%. These figures have some possibility of error since they are based on an assessment of data, not upon a census question. The key information is equal length of time in Lodève for each partner and older children's birth places other than Lodève. Some guesswork is involved if the latter information is lacking, though in 9 out of 10 cases it is present. A good example is the rough carder Jean Garrigues, now 70 years old, who was born in Carcassonne, and married to Anne Malaval, 42, born in Millau. They arrived in Lodeve 10 years before and have one daughter, 15, born in Clermont l'Hérault and another, 7, born in Lodève.

[24]Etat civil de Lodève, Registres de mariage, ADH, 3 E Lodeve.

[25]Marriage contracts (Etudes Géraud, Martin and Clainchar) ADH, 2 E 39-40, have been sampled for the period 1796-1835. Woolens worker marriages to non-Lodévoises number 31 and 12 contracts included dowries in land. For example, Virginia Baldy, woolens worker born in Soubès, brought to her marriage to André Petesque of Lodève 150 francs in cash, her trousseau, and "the revenues from a piece of land for which her father owns the mortgage." Etude Clainchar, no. 89 (May), 1826.

[26]Ibid., Ventes, same period.

[27]These figures suffer, of course, from the typical inadequacy of such records (see David Gordon, "Industrialization and

Republican politics," in J. Merriman, ed., French Cities in the Nineteenth Century (1982), notes 10 and 11, p. 263 for a discussion of their shortcomings). But they provide a nice picture of the range from poverty to relative affluence that existed in the woolens workers' world. It is likely that some indigents escaped investigation by the tax collector altogether. Only during the July Monarchy was this problem overcome, as a "certificate of indigence" became a new bureaucratic control.

[28]ADH, 17 Q^6 10 (Table) and 17 Q^3 12-15.

[29]Woolens was Lodève's only true industry, besides a tiny tanning industry and a collapsing hat-making manufacture. Beyond that, all artisanal activity fell into the category of local service production.

[30]See Paul Marres, Les Grandes causses (1936), Vol. II.

[31]Of 115 marriages of weavers (1796-1810) for which the father-in-law's occupation is listed, 28 wed service artisans' or trademen's daughters. Eight were in the building trades, six in metal trade, five in clothing, five in milling and foods, two shopkeepers, and two in transport.

[32]See J.K.J. Thomson, Clermont-de-Lodève, 1633-1789: Fluctuations in the Prosperity of a Languedocian Cloth-Making Town (1982), 355-430. On Bédarieux, the key materials are in A.N., F^{12} 752, 754, and 1384. The last focusses on a comparison between Clermont and Bedarieux and the complaints of fabricants in the latter against the shady practices of Clermontois.

[33]Thomson, "Variations in Industrial Structure of Pre-industrial Languedoc" (unpublished paper) and A.N., F^{12} 754.

[34]A.N., F^{12} 754.

[35]On the growth during this period, the work of Louis Bergeron is critical. See, in particular, his essai de synthèse, "Problemes economiques de la France napoleonienne," in La France à l'époque napoléonienne (special number of the Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (Juillet-septembre 1970).

[36]The city certainly experienced upheaval in 1791-2, but it was caused by severe economic conditions (army orders were at a standstill and the commercial market had collapsed). A classic grain riot, complete with taxation populaire and the declaration of a "people's municipality," occurred on 13-14 February 1792. ADH, L 946.

[37]See Maurice Garden, Lyon et les lyonnais au XVIII[e] siecle (Paris, n.d.), especially 582-92; Gerard Gayot, "Dispersion et concentration de la draperie sedanaise au XVIII[e] siecle," Revue du Nord (Janvier-Mars 1979), 127-148; Serge Chassagne, "La diffusion rurale de l'industrie cotonnière en France (1750-1850);" ibid., 97-114; Gayot, "La longue insolence des tondeurs de draps dans la manufacture de Sedan au XVIII[e] siècle," Revue du Nord (Janvier-Mars, 1981). The key documents relating to the woolens industry are located in AN, F^{12} 753-790 (Corporations) and 1344-1394 (Draperie), 2301-2302 (Armée).

[38]Adresse et pétition des habitants des lieux de Graissessac, Camplong, Boussagues, les Nyères, Lassalles et autres lieux de la Baronnie de Boussagues contre l'exploitation exclusive de leurs Mines de Charbon. A l'Assemblé Nationale (1790) in ADH, L 4533.

[39]"Relevé des soumissionnaries de [1'an II] ...," AN, F^{12} 1389-90.

[40]"Mémoire" de 7 Thermidor An IX (25 July, 1801).

[41]Archives communales de Lodève, 1G73 and Etat civil de Lodève.

[42]The biographical information is drawn in part from diverse notarial records, ADH, II E39 and 40 and mutations par decès, 17 Q^3.

[43]Mémoire de "Cincinnatus" (1795) AN F^7 3678^2.

[44]Georges Ferre, "La vie politique à Lodève de 1788 à 1793," unpublished Diplôme d'études superieure, Université de Montpellier, 1971. On the Jansenist inheritance, see Appolis, Le Jansenisme dans le diocèse de Lodève (Albi, 1952). On the impact of the Civil Constitution, AN, F^{19} 430-31.

[45]AN, F^7 4561, 3678^1, 3678^2, AF II 182, and especially D III 104.

[46]"Relevé," AN, F^{12} 1389-90.

[47]AN, F^{14} 828 (communications); F^{12} 2301 (Fabreguettes' "Mémoire").

[48]ADH, 2U Tribunal de Commerce de Lodève (non-classé). My thanks to archivist Mme Jacob for dredging this material up for me. This remarkable set of documents provides a day-to-day accounting of all aspects of Cauvy's economic activities, business and personal.

[49]AN, F^{12} 2301; F^7 3678^3; F^7 8449; F^{14} 824.

[50]They comprise a dossier of some 500 pages in AN, F^{12} 2301, which contains most of the correspondence relating to military cloth contracting during the Revolution and Empire.

[51]"L'Association de 35 Fabricants de Lodève," organizational plan dated 3 Prairial An 9, Ibid.

[52]Mémoire de Cincinnatus (1795), AN, F^7 3678^2.

[53]Chaptal to Pierre Fabreguettes, 17 Thermidor An 9 (August 4, 1801), AN, F^{12} 2301.

[54]Salze to Chaptal, 7 Brumaire AN 10 (Nov. 27, 1801); ibid.

[55]Etat civil, mariages, 3 E Lodève (An 5 - 1810).

[56]The key documents detailing these struggles are: A.N., BB^{18} 1221, 1376, 1389, and 1429; ADH, 39, 119 and 125 (some 800 pieces, "Grèves de Lodève") and 20 x 16; ACL 7 F 1 ("Grèves, coalitions").

[57]A.N., F^{19} 5688. On Vallibouze, see Echo de Lodève, 9 avril 1848.

[58]AN, F^{12} 652.

[59]ADH, L 4265.

[60]ADH, L 916-18, 960, 5639; AN, F^7 3678^1.

[61]Gabriel Cholvy, "Religion et politique en Languedoc mediterranéen," in Droite et Gauche (1975), 49-51.

[62]Etat civil, mariages, ADH, 3 E Bédarieux, An 3 - 1814.

[63]See my paper, "The Rise of a Revolutionary Proletariat: Lodève and Bédarieux," (Social Science History Association Meeting, Bloomington, Indiana, Oct. 29, 1982), 29ff..



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